It is recommended (using the links at the bottom of this page), that you read the full story of The Naval Warrant Officer once you have read this page.

  By 1915, virtually all branches had a chief (CWO - Commissioned Warrant Officer) - except for the Telegraphist Branch - who was employable (and indeed employed) in all duties undertaken by commissioned officers of wardroom status of the same branch, except for one rank, namely that of the Chief (CWO) Writer. This was deemed necessary for all CWO's to be employed in these ways especially when fighting a major European War when EVERYBODY should be pulling his weight. The Chief Writer worked alongside Paymaster officers dealing with money; money coming from several sources which to the penny had to be accounted for. Because his official title was a Chief Warrant Officer Writer (notwithstanding that meant he was a commissioned warrant officer, but not called that in official circles by the Admiralty) he was not allowed to receive, pay out, or handle money unless supervised by a wardroom paymaster of whatever rank from sub lieutenant to Fleet Paymaster - any officer with the word 'fleet' preceding his title was a commander. This led to meetings in the Admiralty at Sea Lord level to discuss ways of fully employing the Chief Writer so that other officers could be released for more important jobs chiefly in the administration of the navy under fire. What they came up with, altered the titles of all CWO's no matter what their branch or specialisation. They decided to call the CWO Writer (what in reality he already was) namely a 'commissioned writer', dropping all reference of the CWO rank - that he had the word 'writer' after 'commissioned' meant to all that he was not a wardroom officer but still a warrant officer. Now as a 'commissioned writer' (but still without wardroom status) he could add to his tasks the full and unsupervised handling of money, releasing more senior wardroom officers to tasks like acting as secretaries, heading up supply chains including victualling etc, indeed being more versatile as Supply Officers.

  Just before Jutland in February 1916, it was realised that the Warrant Officer Telegraphist was also restricted in his duties. Before the war, these warrant officers were limited to handling confidential signals only, nothing of a higher caveat and they were responsible for coding and ciphers chiefly using book systems like OTP = One Time Pads. Traffic was piling up awaiting the attention of a commissioned officer for traffic above the confidential caveat. It is important to note that the Telegraphist branch never had the Chief's rank and that the Signals branch was not involved in any coding/decoding duties. Telegraphists and Signalmen were not integrated into one communications branch until very much later, and were treated as two quite separate branches in many ways ### (See just below). The signalman branch had been formed back in the 19th century and was well established with a Signal Boatswain (WO under ten and over ten years) and a CWO. Signal Boatswains over 10 were recorded before 1900 and Chief Signal Boatswains from about the 1909 period. The telegraphists branch by comparison was almost brand new, the first WO's being created on the 18th May 1910. It would have been easy to promote an existing Chief Signal Boatswain to a Commissioned Signal Boatswain but what about the Warrant Telegraphist? A further precedent was set to that of the Commissioned Writer (which later affected new and emerging technical WO's), in that they promoted a Warrant Telegraphist straight to a Commissioned Telegraphist, the first two being so promoted on the 29th February 1916. These commissioned Telegraphist were allowed to handle signals bearing the secret caveat from that point, which would have helped greatly for Jutland, although the Battle only lasted for a few hours, so the traffic generated demanding a secret and top secret caveat would not have been great! From early 1916 onwards, CWO's (where existing) were, in piecemeal fashion, stood down in favour of the commissioned officer rank (non wardroom status). I can find no logical reason for the dates these new ranks were introduced, but for the record these ranks cover some ground:-

Mechanicians CWO	to Commissioned Mechancians - 1915 but CWO ERA's stayed the same
	Commissioned Stewards - 1915
	to Commissioned Electricias - 1915
	to Commissioned Victualling Officers - 1918
	to Commissioned Supply Officers - 1918
	to Commissioned Master at Arms - 1918
	to Commissioned Shipwrights - 1918
	to Commissioned Wardmaster - 1918
	to Commissioned Ordnance Officers - 1919
	to Commissioned Cook - 1919
	to Commissioned Engineers - 1919
then, fittingly (?) first IN and LAST out
	to Commissioned Gunner, Boatswain, Carpenter from approximately - 1924
except (meaning not the first in) bringing up the rear the -
	to Commissioned Signal Boatswain from the early 1930's - approximately 15 years after the Commissioned Telegraphist.

  Quite separately, but not mentioned yet in enough detail, was the ORIGINAL colour coding associated with officers stripes, which were used previous to the colour codes of the five civil officers of 1910 which were the Engineers = Purple; Medical = Red; Accountant = White; Instructor = Light Blue; Assistant Constructor/Shipwrights = Silver Grey - others were added at a later date, i.e., Electrical = Green; Wardmaster = Salmon Pink; Dentist = Orange. These were:-

    Chief Senior Schoolmaster = ½" Black braid
    Clerks = ¼" White cotton
    Warrant officers Engineers under 10 years = ¼" Purple cotton under cuff buttons.

  ### In 1904 there was much comment about the W/T branch, embryonic as it was, that it was seen as a part time job, where would-be telegraphists went off to do other jobs, not necessarily to do with communications but usually to act as electricians, and when there was subsequent wireless activity, others were 'grabbed' from their jobs to man the circuits. These others almost invariably involved bridge watchkeepers, commissioned officers and those on watch in associated decks/areas viz, signalmen. Indeed, the Yeoman of Signals, with his knowledge of the Morse code became quite adept at wireless telegraphy, as did some of the junior signalmen who actually vied with junior telegraphists to be the recognised ships telegraphist. The situation got quite out of hand because often was the case that the "volunteer/pressed man", irrespective of his rank or job, got quite involved in "wireless signalling" that he was not available for his scheduled watch, he already fatigued in terms of hours on deck with their associated necessary and demanded alertness. Captains of vessels and admirals of fleets and squadrons questioned the volatility of the "ships nerve centre" and the piecemeal arrangements made of necessity in situ, made to support the fledgling branch of new technology. By 1905, these same captains and admirals demanded of Their Lordships to provide a professional telegraphist branch, where, once operational and at sea, their sole job was to send and receive radio messages at a goodly speed with great (rather than hitherto amateur) dexterity and nigh on one hundred percent accuracy. During major fleet manoeuvres in the Mediterranean, the then C-in-C, in his post exercise report stated the following. Reports from sea - C-in-C Mediterranean report. For reasons he explains "communications at present are ABSOLUTELY UNRELIABLE. W/T MUST NOT have precedence over V/S. W/T was not used to any great extent in the Russo-Japanese war (also of course of 1905)". The C-in-C went further by stating that :-

    Electrical branch is in charge of W/T - because it uses electricity !
    Yeoman of Signals employed as the early telegraphists to cope with the requirements of Morse code.
    Shortage of V/S personnel as a result.
    (Seen as desirable) - confirm those early telegraphists as permanent telegraphists and continue recruiting to their
    numbers from more junior members of the signalling (V/S) department.

  But, surely this would cripple the signalling department at a time when bridge signalling was as important (if not more so) than W/T signalling.

  Remedy ? Suggestions put forward by the C-in-C Mediterranean did not auger well for the future of the full time professional W/T operator. HMS Vernon, the Signal School, rounded on the C-in-C giving all the reasons why the introduction of the professional W/T branch was not yet possible, reminding all that the Royal Navy was the best W/T equipped navy in the world and that in due course, W/T operators would mirror that statement. It, the professional W/T branch, followed as promised just over a year later, and was formed by existing R.N., telegraphists, by GPO trained telegraph boys, signalmen foregoing their branch skills, and by AWO's (Admiralty Weekly Orders - forerunners of the AFO) trawling for every man-jack from all branches willing to be retrained as telegraphists. It will hurt or even upset some readers when I say (with authority and from profound research) that seven years BEFORE Jutland, the R.N., were well equipped and had had well trained operators, and pose a question as to whether our admirals knew that and why they didn't employ that proven technology? I can just see the naval father of W/T technology (that famous Yorkshire admiral Sir Henry Jackson) who by Jutland was the first sea lord, asking of his admirals at sea (Jellicoe and Beatty) what's wrong with our bloody admirals, in the same vein as Beatty referred to our bloody ships. Poor Henry Jackson, after what to him must have seemed a life time of fighting with Marconi, who, in the end won Admiralty's affection and purchased Marconi's equipment as opposed to HMS Vernon's/Jackson's equipment, wringing his hands in despair, reflecting on lost years, and a crucial battle lost - or was that half won - it certainly was not won?

  Seeing W/T as an unwilling toy, hell bent on not behaving itself and therefore side-lined by the early WW1 British admirals as unpredictable, reminds me of the 1850-1870 period, when the salt-horses didn't like the engineers and steam age and much preferred sail. After all, most of the senior sea going officers of those days wanted, as much as anything, a ship, timely arrived and fully prepared for the battle but without the soot and the residual filth accompanying it, without worrying about that most unfortunate of all naval occasions, that of becalming! Steam and engineering was forced on them just as W/T was forced on admirals post Jutland who turned down a better and more efficient alternative to flag wagging, to their cost. If "equal speed charlie london" means the loss of many thousands of men and many of our so-called fine ships in a less than a twenty four hours time period, then so be it. To others it might mean a classic and dreadful slaughter akin to the army's Somme battle, and yes, W/T versus the archaic V/S technique of yore comes to mind - certainly to mine!

Navy Warrant Officer - Intro

Navy Warrant Officer - Part 1  Navy Warrant Officer - Part 2  Navy Warrant Officer - Part 3

See also the sister-page to the above story Jutland Communicators